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voting

E-voting Stateside

CNET News.com hosted an interesting discussion between various voices in the e-voting debate. It delves into some of the specifics of US electoral legislation but it's still surprising to read some academics claiming that:

  • e-voting systems are not systemically unauditable
  • examining e-banking is a useful way of exploring e-voting issues

No, no, no! While e-voting machines may survive to be examined if questions arise after an election, we cannot be sure that the code on the machine is that used during the election. Candidates have confidence in the results of 'traditional' elections because they can all watch the paper ballots being counted. This simply is not possible with an all-electronic election.

And as for e-banking, it isn't anything like e-voting because it doesn't have to be secure, private AND anonymous. It is the need for these three factors that makes e-voting uniquely challenging technically.

Also US-centric, but useful, is the Association for Computing Machinery's Member Opinion Poll on whether they should lobby for voter verifiability in e-voting. So far 93.9% of respondents somewhat or strongly agree with a physical record of ballots (a stunning 84.98% or 2,382 members strongly agree). This is important because not only does ACM rarely get involved in policy (though more than it used to) but because members have to authenticate themselves before voting.

Categories
voting

‘Open Source’ e-voting in the Netherlands

I'm still catching up on email – horrible how it builds up when you don't have a decent Internet connection.

A few weeks back now The Register reported on how the Dutch have open sourced their e-voting system. To be precise this isn't the code for the Powervote/Nedap kiosks, this is the code developed by LogicaCMG for the KOA remote e-voting project for expats. However as Wolter Pieters says on his excellent page about Dutch e-voting only source not proprietary to LogicaCMG has been published. So you cannot compile and run what has been released.

A report in KableNET contradicts this, quoting an officials as saying “The complete software is available.” But the Kable article is confused over whether this is the software to run the Nedap kiosks or for the KOA remote project.

Either way, it is a good step to publish some of the code, but in terms of verification partial publication is nowhere nearly enough. It's great that the Dutch government forced this much code to go online but we also need measures to track how this code is used on election day. How can we be sure that the source published is that used?

Updated 3/7/04 with link + comment on KableNET story]